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1.0 Introduction 

When entering the 1990s, the economies of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden were struggling with crises. During the postwar era the Nordic social model had become renowned for its way of pooling risks through generous social insurance and extensive public services, and for its corporatist policy coordination with centralized collective bargaining, contributing to high employment and egalitarian income structures (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kjellberg 1992; Kangas and Palme 2005). In the context of rising globalization and adjustment to the EU single market, the crisis in the early 1990s was in wide circles expected to propel demise of the allegedly sclerotic, Social Democratic models. However, Denmark was already recovering, and from the late 1990s the picture changed, with the Nordic countries rising to top international rankings of economic efficiency, employment, and equality. Suddenly, the Nordics were embraced as role models for the EU and praised by international observers for their ability to reconcile efficiency and equity (Sachs 2004; Sapir 2005; OECD 2006). 

Like other open economies, the Nordic countries were hard hit by the sharp decline of international trade in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008. Due to a housing and credit bubble that burst, Denmark also experienced sharp decline in domestic demand. In spite of healthy recoveries in 2010-11, unemployment in all the Nordic countries but Norway remained around 8 percent. Still, with solid public households and sound current account surpluses in recent years, the Nordic models were internationally considered to be well equipped to cope with a period of low growth and austerity in the Euro-zone. This was in stark contrast to the situation after the crisis in the 1990s.
    
How can we account for this shift in the viability of the Nordic models? Can it be attributed to changes in the Nordic social models over the past decades, and what were the political dynamics behind these changes? How have the Nordic countries adjusted to the recent crisis, and how robust will their social models look in its aftermath, faced with the challenges of global competition and ageing and more heterogeneous populations?

When discussing these questions, it should be underlined that the Nordic model is not a fixed and stable set of institutions and policy measures. It has always had to adapt to changing surroundings. Policy instruments have been changing, and the model has been renowned for its capacity for flexible adjustment (Katzenstein 1985). The Nordic social models share many commonalities, but are not identical. Rather, one could speak of equivalence between often quite different institutions and policy measures, leading to roughly similar outcomes. The past decades, Nordic policies have in most respects been in line with contemporary mainstream. The crux of the Nordic model, we will argue, has been the actors’ capacity for coordinated, concerted policy adjustment, which – facilitated by relatively balanced power relations and trust – has enabled coherence and complementarity between policies in key areas.

In the remainder of the paper we, first, elaborate our analytical perspective; second, trace the main changes in the Nordic social models since the 1990s and the politics behind; third, review labour market outcomes 1990-2008 and possible explanations of the favourable trends, fourth, we describe the impact of and responses to financial crisis, and finally conclude.   

Understanding social model change and outcomes  

In the past two decades’ political and scholarly debate about social model change in Europe the main focus has been on the welfare states’ impact on the supply side in the labour market. From this more or less common paradigmatic change, and due to policy transfer between countries, a number of apparently converging policy trends can be identified. However, looking too narrowly on specific policy measures may seriously exaggerate the impression of policy convergence. On closer inspection, policies are typically more different than they appear, and most importantly, a contextual perspective is necessary in order to assess the impact.  

In this paper we argue that the dynamics and outcomes of change in the Nordic social models since the early 1990s have been crucially influenced by the interdependencies and interplay between labour market governance, social policies and macro-economic policies. In our view the main distinctions of the Nordic models are found in the extent to which policies are interacting in a coordinated and coherent way. Rather than looking at specific policy measures, we must assess the meaning and outcomes of changes from a broader perspective, taking into account the labour market context and the macro-economic conditions. 

For instance, most European countries have turned to activation oriented policies, often associated with concepts like workfare and disciplination. However, as illustrated by the discrepant trends in Germany, UK, and the Nordic countries, the impact on employment patterns and inequality has varied starkly across countries with different labour market and macro-economic regimes (Dølvik and Martin 2012 forthcoming). 

Such divergent outcomes of seemingly converging policies – mirrored not least in striking differences in the extent of social and employment dualization – draw attention to the mechanisms which enable and obstruct coordination and complementarity across the three policy domains. In this paper, we suggest that the typically “Nordic” about the “Nordic social models” is to be found in such mechanisms. This coordination must be understood in view of the particular actor constellations, coalition-building, and balances of power in the labour market and in party politics. 

Even though policy changes in the Nordic countries may appear pretty close to the European mainstream, the Nordic countries have somehow got the balance more right than many others. The capacity for coordination and coherence is indeed institutionally contingent and related to country size, political systems etc. However, it is at the same time more sensitive to shifts in party political preferences and in the balance in the labour market than often acknowledged.  Moreover, there is a thin line between success and failure, and between continuity and destabilization of the models, as witnessed in the crisis some twenty years back as well as in the current crisis. Changes in the Nordic models have often come in the wake of major crises – sometimes due to self-inflicted problems.  In the final parts of the paper we will discuss the possible implications of the current European crisis for the prospects of the Nordic models, in view of the other endogenous and external challenges the models are facing.      



2. From crisis in the early 1990s to the top of rankings in the 2000s  

The traditional Nordic model has often been conceptualized by the coordinated interplay between prudent macro-economic policies, encompassing systems of collective bargaining, and extensive, universal welfare states with sizeable public services sectors. When the economic crisis hit the Nordic countries around 1990 – in Denmark​[2]​ this happened 10-15 years earlier – many observers saw this as the ultimate proof of the sclerosis of the Nordic social model (Olson 1990).  However, the causes were related to macroeconomic policy failures coupled with poor management of financial deregulation​[3]​ Nonetheless, the social foundations of the Nordic models came under strain. 

Faced with the credit market deregulation of the 1980s and welfare state expansion, a common feature in Finland, Sweden and Norway was the break​down of coordinated interplay between macro​economic policies and collective bargaining alongside an inability to restrain the credit-induced boom with restrictive fiscal policy. This contributed to demand-driven spirals of wage-price inflation, devaluations, excessive private indebtedness, and ballooning deficits in current accounts, representing a break with the Nordic legacy of pru​dence. The result was overheating and hard landings when the bubbles burst around 1990. 



Figure 1 The social foundations of the Nordic models (Dølvik 2008)
As a result, Finland, Sweden, and Norway experienced sharply falling prices of real property, deep banking crises, sky​rocketing interest rates, volatile currencies, falls in production comparable to the 1930s, and accelerating unem​ployment. In Finland, unemploy​​ment soared to almost 20 percent; in Sweden and Norway, the figures approached 10 percent. Denmark, slowly recovering from previous failures, also saw a new surge of unemployment in 1990-93. No wonder, scores of international observers predicted the demise of the Nordic models, and drastic measures were proposed to bring the situation under control.
 
Looking at the Nordic models fifteen years later, in 2008, the doomsday scenarios had not materialised. The Nordic models had recovered and come back in refurbished and more competitive versions. Within this picture of continuity, significant changes had been undertaken in collective bargaining, economic policies, and social policies. In Finland and Sweden, the financial crisis opened up a huge public deficit, and severe budget cuts had to be implemented. Norway could rely on rising oil revenues, while Denmark underwent a similar cure a decade earlier (Goul Andersen, 2000). Sweden cut budgets in the magnitude of 10 per cent. Crisis packages were rushed through parliaments with broad support, and initiated a period of fiscal austerity which later on morphed into rule-based fiscal policy regimes. In addition, comprehensive, revenue neutral tax reforms, reducing corporate and personal taxes and broadening the tax base were implemented. After a brief period when the currencies were pegged against the ECU, Sweden, Finland, and Norway eventually introduced inflation-based monetary regimes with floating currencies. Finland joined the euro in 1998, and Denmark maintained its stable rate against the euro.  

The institutions of industrial relations and the welfare state had been adjusted, in some respects (e.g. pensions) quite significantly, but the Nordic social model was by no means demolished. In the labour market, past traditions for peak level coordination had given way to more decentralised coordination through pattern bargaining headed by the export sectors, underpinned by close observation of central bank policies and wage growth among the trading partners. Only modest changes had been made in labour market regulation – mostly stemming from implementation of EU directives – except for liberalization of temporary work in Finland and Sweden. Although the coverage of trade unions and collective agreements remained high by international standards, a decline in union density was seen in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, recently propelled by reforms in the Ghent systems of unemployment insurance.  


Table 1 Trade union density in Nordic countries 1985-2010 

	Finland	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
1985	69 	78	57	81 
1990	73 	75	57	80  
1995	80 	73	56	83 
2000	75  	72	53	79 
2005	72  	72	53	77 
2008	68	68	51	68  
2009	69	68	52	68
2010	70	67		68
Change 1995 – 2009/2010	- 10  	- 6 	- 4 	- 15 
Source: Nergaard 2010, based on OECD figures

Welfare expenditures had expanded almost in pace with economic growth, leaving room for improved standards and a host of new rights and services. Investment in education had risen, and Finland and Norway had caught up with their neighbors as regards child care, parental leave and other measures to enhance female participation. All the Nordic countries had tried to restructure benefits and taxes according to what could be described as ‘activation’ of social policies (Barbier 2002), aimed at stimulating employment. Increasing “conditionality” and activation vis-à-vis the unemployed – alongside broader groups of non-employed – were similar to what happened in other European countries (Clasen & Clegg, 2011; Eichhorst et al., 2008). To a large extent, this implied a reinvigoration of the old ‘work line’ in Nordic social policies.  Conditionality often served as an alternative to benefit cuts, even though, in Sweden it was coupled with lowering of caps in unemployment and sickness benefits. Tax cuts especially on low paid work were also granted by the Centre-Right government after 2006, in the same vein as the Danish centre-right government had done in 2004 and the Social Democratic led government in 2012. In all four countries, conditions for early retirement were tightened and the backbone of increasingly multi-pillared pension systems had been significantly changed, strictly relating pensions to contributions and adjusting pensions to longevity as well as providing incentives to work.  

The challenge of a significant growth in the immigrant population had been met by introductory programs, early integration via child care, and increasing emphasis on promoting employment, partly via increasing conditionality as described above. On the whole, the universal Nordic systems remained inclusive, even if Denmark had made cuts in social assistance targeting beneficiaries with high shares of immigrants (Goul Andersen, 2007), reflecting the influence of the Danish People’s Party which was pivotal for majority formation. These measures were eventually abolished after the defeat of the Liberal-Conservative government in 2011.  
 
The sharp rise in mobility of workers and service providers from the new Member States after the 2004 Enlargement fuelled the boom in the 2000s but was also accompanied by more wage dumping and circumvention of rules that put the Nordic labour regimes under pressure.  Concern has also been voiced that evolution of a layer of low-wage casual work, in combination with EUs coordination of social security, may engender increased burdens on the social benefit system (NOU 2011: 7). To provide proper conditions Finland and Norway mainly followed the continental approach set out in the Posting of Workers Directive (EC 71/1996), relying on statutory extension of minimum pay and core standards defined in collective agreements, underpinned by strengthened state control and enforcement measures (Alsos and Eldring 2011). Denmark and Sweden, by contrast, relied on their traditional approach based on unions entering collective agreements with foreign companies, if necessary by means of boycott and sympathy actions. As the CJEU decision in Laval deemed the Swedish practice in breech with EU law, Sweden adjusted its posting law so that industrial action against foreign companies is only allowed to underpin demands for the statutory minimum (including minimum pay anchored in national agreements). 
  In spite of profound societal changes, it is altogether fair to say that the Nordic social models by 2008 basically had been consolidated but changed towards stronger emphasis on work incentives and investment in human capital, as well as stricter fiscal discipline.  

Accounting for the pattern of adjustment in the Nordic social models 1990-2008

The path of adjustment during the 1990s was in line with contemporary mainstream wisdom, calling for more employment friendly social models. Rather than a product of grand design, changes were often a result of incremental, trial-and error adjustments. Like in Denmark in the 1980s, the crises of the early 1990s had a formative impact on key actors and parties, creating a ‘moment of truth’ and a sense of national urgency. The international attention to the challenge of aging worked the same way. While contributing to a broad-based understanding that forceful measures were needed, the settlements and changes that followed resulted from contentious political negotiations and compromises conditioned by the inherited institutional ramifications.  

In the early 1990s, Conservative parties and employer confederations, particularly in Sweden, apparently wanted to use the crisis to roll back the welfare state and to reduce union power and labour market regulations. However, with major parts of the electorates and most unions and employer federations seeing an interest in protecting their stakes in the existing social model, there was insufficient political support for radical breaks with the past. Yet, major welfare and tax reforms, liberalization of product markets coupled with adjustment to the EU single market, and changes in the macro-economic policy regimes were largely enacted with broad support from the main political parties. In the wake of the crisis, the Centre-Right was replaced by Social Democratic led governments, which steered a cautious course of reform balancing between market liberalization and preservation of the basic tenets of the social models.

In the new millennium, shifts in the economic and political climate brought more tension over social model reform. In Denmark, the shift in emphasis from “social investment” towards (ever) more disciplinary “work first” policies eventually eroded the political consensus, and changes were increasingly carried through by narrow political majorities. Similarly, in Sweden, changes in the Ghent systems of unemployment insurance and lowering of caps in social benefits undertaken by the Centre-Right government heightened the level of political conflict. 

Nevertheless, a central part of the explanation for the trajectory of adjustment was the institutional architecture of the social models which contributed to a relative balance of power and pressure for compromise among the social partners and main political parties not least in times of austerity and high unemployment. Also centrist parties saw an interest in buying into ‘inclusionary coalitions’. The struggles over EU membership apparently reinforced such political dynamics. More ambitious neo-liberal reformers lacked political clout and support to move forward with radical ideas.  Broadly speaking, the political Right came to the conclusion that the road to power goes via cautious reform and acceptance of the Nordic social model. This strategy shift was successful and brought Centre-Right coalitions to power in all the Nordic countries in the first centennium of the 2000s.​[4]​ With the centre-right eventually becoming reliant on support from welfare chauvinist parties which tap into traditional labour constituencies, the coalitions supporting preservation of the national social models have apparently been broadened – except as far as inclusion of immigrants is concerned. 





3. Trends in employment and inequality 1990-2008   

After a period of strong job growth in the late 1980s, Finland, Sweden and Norway experienced drastic falls in employment when the credit and housing bubbles burst in the early 1990s. Employment (age group 15-64) dropped 17.5 percent in Finland, 12.5 percent in Sweden, and around 5 percent in Denmark and Norway, while unemployment soared from very low levels to more than 16 percent in Finland, 10 percent in Sweden, 9.6 in Denmark and 6 percent in Norway (Harmonized rates, OECD LFS statistics). After the trough, employment growth picked up in the 1990s, for the first time in two decades also in Denmark, and accelerated during the 2005-08 bonanza, after a halt during the ICT-slump. Employment increased by 22.5 percent in Finland (1994-2008) and 14.0 percent in Sweden (1997-2008), but the number of jobs had just reached the pre-crisis levels in 2008. By comparison, employment in Denmark was 11.4 percent higher in 2008 than in 1993, and 26.4 percent higher in Norway. In spite of strong employment records, the Swedish and Finnish experiences underscore how long it can take to regain the losses after a major slump. From 2004 onwards, employment growth benefited from inflows of migrant labour from the new EU Member States, most pronouncedly in Norway (Dølvik & Eldring 2008). 
 	
The common sequence of huge job-losses followed by solid recoveries is reflected in the changes in employment and unemployment rates shown in Chart 3.1 (next page).  Most dramatically, the employment rate in Finland dropped from 74.7% in 1990 to 60.7%, and in Sweden from the all-time peak of 83.1% in 1990 to 71.5 in 1994. After the trough in the mid-1990s, however, employment rates rose in parallel with increasing labour forces by approximately 10 percentage points in Finland and 5-6 points in the other countries till 2008. In effect, Denmark and Norway moved to top the Nordic employment ranking, while the employment rates in Sweden and Finland remained lower than in 1990. Nevertheless, all the Nordic countries boasted markedly higher employment rates than EU15 as a whole in 2008, mostly due to higher rates among women and elderly.​[5]​ In full-time equivalents all the Nordic countries were well above other EU countries (see Hemerijck and Eichorst 2009: 312). 

The Nordic sequence of crisis and recovery is mirrored in the rates of unemployment (see next page), which in 2008 had fallen as much as 10 percentage points in Finland, 6.3 in Denmark, 3.7 in Sweden, and 4.1 in Norway since the peak in the 1990s. Strikingly, unemployment in Denmark dropped from almost 10 percent in 1993 to around 3 percent in 2001, while Swedish unemployment dropped even faster in the late 1990s but bounced back during the ICT-crisis.



Chart 1 Employment and unemployment rates 1990-2008, 15-64 years

    
    

In general, Nordic unemployment had in 2008 been more than halved since the peak in the mid-90s, implying that the rates of joblessness in all the Nordic countries were lower than in EU15 as a whole. At the same time there was, contrary to most Continental European countries, a trend towards reduced shares of part-time, temporary jobs, and atypical work. From 2004, the inflow of labour migrants from the New Member States of the EU added to employment growth; in Norway, which received the largest flows, EU labour migrants accounted for 50-60 per cent of employment growth 2004-2010 and almost 10 per cent of the labour force (of which young around 60,000 mostly young Swedes), leading to a rise in low-paid employment in certain sectors.  

Equity and dualisation 

In spite of deindustrialization and sweeping restructuring, the Nordic countries still stand out with the most egalitarian structures of wages and incomes among the industrialized countries, and comparatively low shares of low paid work. The picture hasn’t changed much, even though those in the highest rungs have enjoyed the largest increases. Intergenerational income mobility is higher than in the USA and UK (Kvist et al. 2011).  

Measured by the Gini index, the Nordic countries display a modest increase in income inequality since 1990, with values increasing from the range of 22-23 in the mid-1990s to 24-26 in the mid-2000s. The same picture pertain to earnings inequality, where Table 1 shows the customary measures P90/P10 and P90/P50, computed on earnings of full-time employed people. Greater increases were seen within the highest earnings decile, however, where the very top moved ahead. 

Table 1. Earnings decile ratios for full time employed people
	1990	1995	2000	2004	2007
Den, P90/P10	2.2	2.5 (1996)	2.5	2.6	2.69
Den, P90/P50	1.6	1.7 (1996)	1.7	1.7	1.74
Fin, P90/P10	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.55
Fin, P90/P50	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.76 
Nor, P90/P10		2.0 (1997)	2.0	2.1 (2002)	2.23
Nor, P90/P50		1.4 (1997)	1.4	1.5 (2002)	1.46 
Swe, P90/P10	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.34
Swe, P90/P50	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.67
Source: OECD Online Employment Database. 

The modest rise in income inequality captured by the Gini index may partly reflect a less equitable distribution of employment opportunities. Inter-country comparisons reveal a correlation between employment rate changes and changes in the inequality of market incomes. For Sweden and Finland, the deep slump of the 1990s left, as shown above, long-lasting scars on the overall employment rate. Both countries saw increased incomes inequality, but this was not reflected in earnings inequality among individuals in full time employment.  Besides, it was influenced by growth in capital income in the top, changes in household and partner structures associated with immigration and so-called assortive mating patterns. The increased inequality of market incomes was in the Nordic countries – more than in most other countries – still duly mitigated by the mechanisms of the welfare state, without which the increase in household income disparity would have been markedly larger.  



Accounting for the favourable trend in labour market outcomes 1990-2008 

The crises in the 1980-90s were not a result of the social model but of a sequence of economic policy coordination failures. In the subsequent processes of adjustment and recovery, however, the social model institutions and actors played an important role in conditioning political responses, preventing a surge in inequality, and enabling change in labour market and social policies.   

The ensuing Nordic labour market recoveries were a result of many factors.  Firstly, after profound restructuring, the industrial structures in the small open Nordic economies apparently fitted well to the emerging pattern of international and domestic demand growth associated with the rise in the ICT-industry, in services, and in the Chinese economy (Erixon 2011; Mjøset et al. 2011). The devaluations in Sweden, Finland and Norway in the early 1990s and the return to coordinated wage restraint brought improved competitiveness and exports. Sweden went from a trade deficit to a trade surplus 1992-1998 which was equivalent to a stimulus of 6 percent of domestic GDP (Krugman 2011). Tax reforms were considered “employment friendly”. While cheaper imports reduced inflation and the deregulation of product markets contributed to enhanced economic efficiency and productivity (Holmlund 2009) – with Denmark as an exception in the 2000s – the employment recovery in the wake of the crisis was facilitated by solid demand growth both in international and domestic markets.​[6]​  

Secondly, alongside solid demand growth, the reforms aimed at increasing the supply of labour and skills (education, activation, and family/work policies) stimulated the shift towards more skilled employment and higher value added production. The decline in the supply of less-skilled workers contributed to maintain their negotiating power in the labour market. The returns were facilitated by well developed, growing public sectors; by enhancing both the supply and demand for female labour in particular, the public sector contributed to the rise in employment and to stem the growth in labour market dualization seen in many other countries during the processes of de-industrialization. (Dølvik 2001, Swank et al. 2008).

Thirdly, industrial and labour market restructuring was probably enhanced by the generous income security schemes and the strong tier of company level bargaining – enabling negotiated adjustment. Combined with the egalitarian wage policies​[7]​ and the upward shift in supply of skills, these factors also helped prevent a significant rise in low pay employment and dualization of the labour market. The other way around, stricter application of eligibility criteria and (the deterrent effects of) activation apparently helped counteract deadweight and disincentive problems associated with generous income security schemes (Agell 2003) and underpin the impact of ALMP (Oetsch 2010), serving as a functional equivalent to cuts in benefits. How vigorously the turn to activation was implemented did indeed vary. The Danes were toughest, invested most heavily in ALMPs, and saw a conspicuous drop in unemployment during the 1990s. Yet the cause of lower employment performance in Sweden and Finland was evidently the much deeper crisis, giving rise to hysteresis effects which in turn seem to have generated stronger segmentation (Berglund et al. 2010). 

Fourth, the Nordic countries have been characterized by high labour market mobility, both in-out and within the labour market. In the literature this is often attributed to the institutional complementarities associated with Danish ‘flexicurity’. However, a recent study of intra-Nordic variations in mobility 2001-2006 gives little support for this interpretation (Berglund and Furåker 2010). Even if Denmark scores highest on mobility, Norway shows almost as good results and much better than Sweden, even though Norway is behind both Denmark and Sweden as far as institutional ‘flexicurity’ indicators are concerned. This suggests that the demand side plays a crucial role in the way changes in supply side institutions affect labour market outcomes. That became abundantly clear under the 2008 financial crisis, to which we turn next. 


4. The financial crisis: impact and responses 

As small, open economies, the Nordic countries were hard hit by the international financial crisis 2008-2009. With the exception of the Danish credit and housing bubbles, the newest financial crisis came as a pure external shock for the Nordic economies.​[8]​ In Sweden, Finland and Norway the severe banking crisis in the early 1990s had prompted development of more stringent systems of regulation and monitoring; their financial institutions were therefore relatively well equipped to face the financial crisis.  Thus, in Sweden, Finland and Norway the crisis came as a shock in exports, coinciding with a flattening of growth in private consumption and a negative shock to productivity growth. Being heavily dependent on selling investment goods, especially Finland and Sweden were hard hit, but also Denmark suffered a larger fall in GDP in 2008-2009 than OECD economies on average. With GDP falling 5-8 per cent in 2008-2009, Finland, Sweden and Denmark saw unemployment rise by 3-4 percentage points (see below). 

Macroeconomic policy responses

Having developed strong fiscal positions since the slump in the 1990s, the Nordic countries were able to cushion the shock by easing fiscal policy and cutting interest rates. But compared to other OECD countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries in particular, the Nordic countries did not stand out as fiscal activists in their response to the crisis. Norway was an exception though, showing fiscal stimulus on par with that of Finland and Denmark, in spite of a milder recession and drop in exports.   

Table 1 GDP growth and demand components of the recession 2008–2009, annual per cent change 
	Real private consumption 2008	Real private consumption 2009	Export volume 2008	Export volume 2009	GDP* growth 2008-9
Denmark	-0.6	-4.5	2.8	-9.7	-5.2 / -6.6
Finland	1.8	-3.1	0.4	-18.7	-8.2
Norway	1.6	0.2	1.0	-4.0	-1.7
Sweden 	-0.1	-0.3	1.3	-13.3	-5.1 
Source: For real private consumption: OECD Economic Outlook November 2011, Statistical Annex, Preliminary Version. For Exports: OECD Economic Outlook May 2011.  
*) Economic Outlook 2011 November

Still, fiscal policy clearly alleviated the crisis in all the Nordic economies. In Table 4.2, the first column records the discretionary fiscal stimulus (according to a standard measure: the deterioration of the cyclically adjusted budget balance) and the second column displays the deterioration of the total general government financial balance. The difference between the two quantities can be interpreted as a crude measure of the impact of automatic stabilisers. 

Table 2 Fiscal stimuli during the recession. 
	Projected change in general government cyclically-adjusted balance 2008–2010, % of potential GDP	Projected change in general government financial balance 2008–2010, % of nominal GDP.
Denmark	-2.0	-6.1
Finland	-3.5	-7.0
Norway	-2.8	-4.4 
Sweden	-0.1	-2.3 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, November 2011. Note: the change is calculated as the balance 2010 minus the balance 2008.

When comparing the magnitude of the discretionary expansion with the size of the export and consumption shocks, Norway stands out. The Finnish discretionary policy packages were somewhat larger than the Norwegian one, but Finland’s export collapse was far worse. It is further noteworthy that the policy package of the Red-Green Norwegian government consisted almost exclusively of expenditure increases, whereas those of the more liberal governments in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland in particular were much more tilted towards tax cuts, many of which would in fact become permanent.​[9]​ The Danish case is special as the main stimulus was actually an unfinanced tax relief which had been decided in 2007, more than a year before the outbreak of the international financial crisis.​[10]​ Notable is also the significant impact of the automatic stabilizers, especially in Finland and Denmark. 

The recession was a shock as symmetric as can be, and all central banks were slashing their interest rates accordingly. Thus, Finland as euro member, Denmark shadowing ECB, and Norway and Sweden as independent “inflation targeters” all enjoyed a loose monetary policy during the crisis, mostly so in Sweden.​[11]​ For Sweden, an extra stimulus was provided by the significant – and, as to its scale, unanticipated – depreciation of the Krona from the onset of the crisis, particularly against the euro (by early 2010 more than 15 per cent). A similar but weaker effect may have helped Norway, whose Krona also depreciated in 2009. Finland and Denmark, by contrast, experienced a reverse effect with the euro rising in 2009 and then falling. Since 2009, the exchange rate between the Swedish Krona and the euro, including Finland and Denmark, has returned to its former trend, while the Norwegian currency has surged vis-a-vis the Swedish Krona and the euro (including DKK).    

To sum up, the fiscal responses helped ease the recession somewhat but were, except in Norway, fairly modest in international comparison. In general, Nordic governments were concerned about the soundness of their fiscal positions and their international creditworthiness. These are not irrelevant concerns in view of the dramatic lending costs some EU countries were facing; in fact, Denmark, Sweden and Finland all maintained public deficits below 3 per cent. EMU debt was far below 60 per cent of GDP. And net debt according to OECD was zero in Denmark and negative in Sweden and Finland. Hence, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Luxemburg were the only among 27 EU countries complying with the convergence criteria throughout the crisis (Goul Andersen & Olofsson, 2012; OECD Econ.Outlook database 2012) Yet the cautious fiscal activism also reflects the extensive social insurance systems alleviating the private pains of macroeconomic recessions and enhancing the sizeable Nordic automatic stabilisers (Andersen and Holden 2011). 

 
Previous overheating and ante-crisis macroeconomic policy  

Even though the financial crisis came as an external shock, the severity of its repercussions and the countries’ responses were also a function of economic policies during the preceding boom. Table 4.3 (below) depicts the change in the general government cyclically adjusted balance 2005 through 2008, showing that Denmark where GDP fell most during the crisis, was also the one in which the discretionary part of fiscal policy contributed to overheating in 2005 through 2008. 
The government in Denmark was most complacent 2005-2008 (Economic Council, 2009; Birch Sørensen, 2010); its loose policy based on a tax freeze and using rising oil revenues to boost public budgets turned an endogenous consolidation of government finances into an overall deterioration. Combined with liberalization of asset based borrowing and falling private saving, the worst overheating of housing prices was unsurprisingly observed in Denmark.	As regards 

Table 3 Fiscal stance in the preceding boom.
	Change in general government cyclically-adjusted balance 2005–2008, % of potential GDP	Change in general government financial balance 2005–2008, % of nominal GDP.
Denmark	-2.8	-1.7
Finland	+0.4	+1.5
Norway	+3.1	+4.0
Sweden	+0.7	+0.3
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, November 2011.

credit policy, the Danish governments did the opposite of the tightening pursued 1986-1992, and stimulated credit expansion more than ever. This explains most of the housing bubble (Dam et al., 2011). Interest-only loans were introduced in October 2003, followed by an average increase of housing prices of 60 per cent 2004-2006. The failure of the government to cool down the economy was facilitated by the Danish currency peg to euro which prevents the Central Bank from using the interest instrument. But it was also a calculated risk. Denmark’s task of aligning its monetary, fiscal and wage policies was arduous at best, and the risk for pro-cyclical demand policies obvious. 						
	
In this view, it is neither surprising that Denmark’s competitive position deteriorated markedly during the decade up to the crisis, especially compared to Finland and Sweden.​[12]​ Consequently, when the bubble burst, private consumption in Denmark fell during the crisis (2008q1-2010q3) by as much as 4.5 percent compared with a rise in Sweden of 2.5 percent. Total domestic demand fell by 6.2 percent while it remained stable in Sweden (Arbejder​bevegelsens Ervervsråd 2011, Ugebrevet A4, 16.3.2011). 

By 2011, Danish homeowners were the most indebted in the world, and about one-half of all housing credit was financed by flexible interest-only loans. This made the housing market extremely sensitive to fluctuations in short-term interest rates, and private savings soared in the wake of the crisis. Taking also into account the need to finance the 2009 tax reform, private consumption was even with prospects of extremely low interest rates a less likely driver of growth after the financial crisis than it would normally have been.


Labour market consequences and responses 

The recession brought rises in unemployment and declines in employment in all the Nordic countries. While Norway and Denmark entered the crisis with only 2-3 percent unemployment, the level in Sweden and Finland was 6-7 percent. By early 2010 unemployment in Sweden and Finland had jumped almost 3 percentage points, in Denmark by 4 points, and in Norway by only 1 point  (OECD, harmonised rates). The rise in unemployment in the Nordic countries was, except in Norway, markedly higher than in EU15. Especially youth unemployment rose substantially,​[13]​ whereas the share of long-term unemployed (below 30 per cent of the jobless) by end of 2011 remained low in European comparison (European Commission 2011). 

Still, especially in Finland and Sweden, the job-losses and increases in unemployment were considerably lower than the drop in production.  While the 2009 drop in production was comparable to that of the 1990s slump, unemployment increased far less. Even though employment rates fell markedly, the firms tried to hoard personnel, anticipating a shortage of skilled labour in the aftermath (Svalund et al. 2012, forthcoming). This effect was even more pronounced in many continental countries (OECD 2010) whereas Denmark – in accordance with the logic of flexibility – saw less hoarding and a sharper drop in employment rates.  The flip side of hoarding has been low growth or even a decline in productivity, which holds for Denmark as well. In 2011, employment picked up and unemployment started to fall in the Nordic countries except Denmark (European Commission 2011). 

Chart 4.1 Unemployment and employment rates 15-64, 2000-2011


Unemployed of all labour force, Eurostat – 2012-03-21, Statistics Norway 2012-04-16


 Employment rates 16-64, OECD Statextracts 2012-04-16

The downturn after the financial crisis gave rise to new arrangements in the labour market, especially in Sweden where no state-funded lay-off scheme existed. Wage restraint was in several instances complemented by new mechanisms allowing local actors to refrain from centrally agreed increments. In the hard-hit manufacturing and construction industries the local social partners tried out new negotiated schemes for risk and burden sharing through shorter working hours and rotating layoffs, sometimes combined with training schemes. Except in Sweden, such practices were facilitated by government adjustment of schemes for short time work, allowing lower thresholds for temporary lay-offs, extending duration, and easing user costs. In Finland more than 3% of the workforce were temporarily laid-off in 2009, contrasted with less than 1 per cent in Denmark and Norway. Regulative differences in dismissal criteria implied stronger trade union involvement in local adjustment processes in Sweden and Norway, where application of seniority principles require union consent, than in Finland and Denmark in particular where dismissals is an employer prerogative (Svalund et al. 2012forthcoming).  
In Denmark, the duration of unemployment benefits was reduced from four to two years as part of a so-called “economic recovery plan”. Moreover, requirement for requalification was doubled. In the collective bargaining of 2010 the trade unions, in response, won strengthened job and income security by rises in severance pay supplementing unemployment benefits up to 85 per cent of previous wage levels. As such compensation depends on tenure it implies a further departure from previous “flexicurity” ideals. 
  
In Sweden, the absence of a state-funded temporary lay-off scheme spurred the trade union IF-Metall to negotiate a national ‘crisis agreement’ with its employer counterpart spring 2009 (Svalund et al. 2012). This allowed local actors to negotiate cuts in working hours by up to 20 per cent with (almost) corresponding cuts in payments, allowing firms to retain skilled labour and adjust the overall payroll bill while distributing the earnings cuts among union members. Reportedly as much as 70-80,000 employees in the metal-sector were in 2009 involved in such schemes.  Due to the exodus from the UEI-system after the centre-right government’s tightening of rules in 2007, the high share of unemployed with no entitlement to insurance (64 percent late 2011) brought the issue of a compulsory unemployment insurance scheme back into discussion within the Commission on Social Security reform.  Early 2012, the prospect of renewed downturn in the euro-zone led the social partners in the metal industry to sign a new agreement on how to tackle future crisis; building on experience with the ‘crisis agreement’ the new short-time work and training scheme ensures workers 90 percent pay if working hours are cut 20 percent, 85 percent pay if hours are cut 40 percent, and 80 percent pay in case of 60 percent cuts in hours, without loss of pension and social benefit rights. The parties demanded that the state covers the discrepancy between pay and hours cut, and were met by positive responses from the Minister of Finance who set down a committee to sketch a new law on short-time work. 

The innovations in Swedish collective agreements in the wake of the crisis signal increased emphasis on internal flexibility as a means to cushion market turmoil. Resembling German style ‘employment pacts’, this may indicate a departure from the old Rehn Meidner model’s prescription of external mobility. Similar tendencies could be witnessed in the other Nordic countries (Svalund et al. 2012), reflecting the emphasis on retaining company specific skills in competence-intensive Nordic industries.

In Denmark, tripartite negotiations in the Spring 2012 were planned to provide a higher labour supply and provide some unspecified improvements in return. However, as the unions were unwilling to sacrifice holidays as long as high unemployment prevailed, the government broke off the negotiations that were rather half-heartedly prepared anyway.
Implications beyond the crisis  

In 2010-2011, the Nordic economies were regaining pace, especially in Sweden where economic growth reached 6.1 and 3.9 per cent, respectively, while the employment rate reached its highest level in 20 years (Konjunktur​institutet 20.3.2011). In Finland, GDP increased by 3.6 and 2.9 percent. At the other end, Denmark was recovering slowly from a deeper crisis, with a cumulative decline in GDP 2008-2010 of 4.1 per cent and only 1.0 percent growth in 2011. According to the OECD Economic Outlook, GDP was expected to flatten in 2012-13 with Denmark hovering around 1 percent and the other growing a bit faster (around 2 percent). 

Table 4 Economic growth rates in the Nordic Countries, 2001-2011. Percentages.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Denmark 	0,7	0,5	0,4	2,3	2,4	3,4	1,6	-0,8	-5,8	1,3	1,0
Sweden 	1,3	2,5	2,3	4,2	3,2	4,3	3,3	-0,6	-5,0	6,1	3,9
Finland 	2,3	1,8	2,0	4,1	2,9	4,4	5,3	1,0	-8,2	3,6	2,9
Norway 	2,0	1,5	1,0	3,9	2,7	2,3	2,7	0,0	-1,7	0,7	1,6

Source: OECD annual growth rates (www.oecd.org). Read 25.feb.2012. National statistical offices for 2011(Last update feb.29, 2012 (Dk/Swe). Mar 2 (Fin). Mar 7 (Nor))  Revised Sw/No figures 2009 & 2010 (29.2.2012)

Apart from Norway with its huge ‘oil fund’ and surpluses, public deficits were in 2010 varying from 2,8 percent of GDP in Denmark and Finland to 0,1 percent in Sweden while public debt was very low by international comparison (in Sweden and Finland there is no net debt at all, in Denmark it is below 10 per cent of GDP). Unemployment is still much higher (especially among young people)​[14]​ than when the crisis started, but (standardised) rates were by 2.quarter 2012 fallen to 7.5 percent in Denmark and Sweden, 7.6 in Finland, and to 3.2 per cent in Norway (OECD 2012). Wage differences among fulltime employed changed very little from 2007 to 2009 (OECD Stat.extracts 2012-13-4). 

Hence, the Nordic models still seem to retain much of the flexible adjustment capacity once attributed to them.  Due to the shift towards sounder, rule-based fiscal policies in the 1990s, and in Sweden and Norway due also to the sharpened interest rate weapon of the Central Banks, the Nordic public finances are by 2012 in much better shape than after the former crisis. Hence, despite a severe downturn, the Nordic countries still belong to the tiny group who are well within the criteria of the EU Growth and Stability Pact, showing minimal public deficits, low public debt, and solid current accounts – in 2011, ranging from a minor deficit in Finland to a surplus of 6.6 percent in Denmark, 7.2 in Sweden, and 14.2 percent in Norway.​[15]​ In Sweden, Finland and Norway the repercussions of the financial crisis did not create any crisis consciousness comparable with the early 1990s. For the great majority who had a job, real disposable income increased – due to exceptionally low interest rates and, except in Norway, sizeable tax reliefs. In Denmark, the situation was not entirely different, and the size of Danish pension funds (including some 40 per cent postponed taxes) was almost equivalent to the Norwegian oil fund. However, indebtedness and declining value of real assets will have repercussions for quite a while. 

As such, the crisis has had limited impact on social policies, but especially in Denmark it has prompted initiatives that could give momentum to more significant change. In Sweden and Denmark, the decline in union membership may also have long-term effects on power relations. Further, the turn towards UK style “incentivation” by means of lower benefit caps, reduced taxes especially on low-paid work, and in-work benefits might spur a secondary segment in the labour market. Tax and social policy change in Denmark resembles Sweden. This became even more significant under the Social Democratic led government in 2012 when tax relief was partly financed by cuts in social transfers, partly left unfinanced (formally financed by advancing the taxes on certain pension schemes). In addition, Denmark has de facto abandoned its “flexicurity” scheme. As the voter reaction was a drop in support for the Social Democratic party from 25 per cent in the 2011 election (the lowest level for more than 100 years) to some 16-17 per cent in the early summer of 2012 (with the government coalition partner Socialist People’s Party suffering even more), party leadership has a strong incentive to redirect its political course. 

In the labour market, the trade unions have shown wage restraint and consented to new forms of local flexibility in working time and pay in order to safeguard jobs. In Sweden the social partners in manufacturing have departed from the Rehn Meidner logic and bargained innovative agreements on short-time work, likely to be co-funded by government. Traditional tripartite crisis pacts were, in contrast to former crisis, not seen in any of the Nordic countries. On the contrary, Finnish and Swedish employers called for further decentralization during the crisis but eventually returned to the central bargaining tables. Unions have stepped up efforts to combat social dumping and the rising use of temp agencies, and in Denmark and Norway the issue of job security has risen through strengthened focus on severance pay. 

Altogether, while the Nordic countries may not always have handled the economic situation well, the Nordic social models would not seem economically shaken by the crisis. Whether this holds also for political reactions remain to be seen. In Sweden and Norway, a well-functioning economy is likely to reduce pressures for change. Basically this also holds true in Finland and Denmark, but here the political repercussions are less predictable. A looming challenge, however, is that, except in Norway, unemployment has risen to markedly higher levels than before.      



5. Summary, conclusions, and questions for the future 

For many observers it is a puzzle that the Nordic models with their generous welfare states, large public sectors, regulated labour markets, and strong trade unions have continued to top rankings of economic and employment performance. However, the rationale of the Nordic models has been to promote national prosperity by exploiting the global division of labour while pooling economic risks. In a context of deregulated product markets and fiercer competition, the aim has been to enhance adjustment and reconcile efficiency and equity by means of income security, egalitarian wage setting, and investment in human and social capital. A prerequisite for such a virtuous dynamic is that the power-relations between the main actors and institutions in politics and the labour market are reasonably balanced. In the 1980s, mounting imbalances caused a crisis, reminding that there is a thin line between success and failure in such concerted models. 

Our analysis shows that the Nordic social models have been subject to institutional consolidation and substantial transformation over the past two decades. Apart from a rather systematic trend towards activation of social policy, the changes were not a product of grand strategic choices but rather of incremental, trial-and error processes where pragmatic search for consent during hardship was often more salient than conflict. Generally speaking, the changes do not imply irreversible shifts in the basic principles of the Nordic models. The changes did not always work as intended, but learning through ‘trial and error’ is partly the essence of what the Nordic models have been about – not a fixed set of institutions and policies but a configuration of institutionalized power relations and reciprocity which tends to induce the main actors to handle crisis and change in cooperative, negotiated ways (Magnusson et al. 2009). The question for the future is whether current changes in the socio-demographic and political landscapes – associated with greater heterogeneity and growing populist parties – engender shifts in the pattern of interests and power-relations that in the longer run will lead to more systemic and, possibly, irreversible transformations.       

Our story about the adjustments in the Nordic models since the crises in the 1980-1990s can be summarized as follows. Firstly, macro-economic regimes were modernized by establishment of rule-based fiscal and monetary policies geared towards stabilization and low inflation. The specific ways varied in terms of currency regimes and links to the euro. Secondly, convergence towards the international economic mainstream prompted adjustments in the pattern of wage setting. Wage coordination headed by the exposed sectors, underpinned by close observation of central bank policies and wage growth among trading partners became the order of the day. In Sweden and Denmark this was combined with decentralization of actual pay setting to company levels, whereas Finland and Norway saw a revival of centralized incomes policies, recently followed by some decentralization. The main pillars of labour market regulation have been retained, albeit rising labour immigration has spurred a shift towards statutory regulation and decisions of the European courts have challenged certain national practices regarding the rights of posted foreign workers. Thirdly, the stricter emphasis on the duty to work and the more forceful use of carrots and sticks were partly new but also meant that an old ‘work line’ in Nordic social policies was reinvigorated. Fourth, the pension challenge was, except perhaps in Finland, handled swiftly and proactively, years ahead of the protracted adjustments in most other countries. The measures to enhance and upgrade labour supply were complemented by expansion of the ‘free’ education systems, continued initiatives to boost female work participation by measures to reconcile work and family responsibilities, and targeted efforts for immigrants. Altogether, these adjustments contributed to dynamics of interaction between the supply- and demand side in the labour markets which – facilitated by growth in domestic and international product markets – generated favourable development in labour market outcomes.   

With a few recent exceptions, the bulk of these adjustments represented a return to traditional Nordic virtues by somewhat altered means, and gained broad bipartisan support. Hence, most changes in the Nordic social models over the past decades do not signal a break with the Nordic legacy, but represent a move towards a new balance between market-based and institution-based coordination – between ‘markets and politics’. In these renewed Nordic ‘hybrids’, the liberal​ization of product markets have been accommodated by new ways of restoring economic prudence while largely preserving the egalitarian structure of distribution.  Rather than “politics against markets” this is a case of “politics with markets”, which has brought more efficiency in the sphere of production, a more active and sometimes tougher state hand in social policies, and a sharper state hand in economic governance – securing reserves for hard times. As a development both Social Liberals and Social Democrats can subscribe to, the Nordic models are characterized by ‘competitive solidarity’ (Streeck 2000) and still seem to retain their capacity for flexible adjustment (Katzenstein 1985).    

As to the political foundations, a striking development is that the Liberal-Conservative parties typically gave up their longstanding opposition to the Nordic labour-cum-welfare regimes. Rather, they chose to embrace the Nordic social model, and this brought them back in power in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and temporarily in Norway. Discontent with immigration policies, and in some instances political distrust and unease with EU policies, have brought welfare chauvinist parties –tapping core constituencies of Social Democracy – into influential tipping positions in the Nordic political systems. The Danish Peoples Party and the Norwegian Progress Party were followed by the Swedish Democrats and the True Finns, the common denominator of which is calls for more restrictive immigration policies, opposition of EU policies, less taxes, and more welfare state spending – except for foreigners. 

In working life, growing labour migration and low-cost competition, tension over EU rules, and decline in unionization and collective bargaining coverage, have set traditional means of labour market governance under pressure and caused disagreement between organizations and parties over how to respond. The decisions of the ECJ in Viking, Laval, and Rüffert, and the approaches of the EFTA-court and ESA (the EEA Surveillence Authority) to similar issues have stirred opposition among Nordic trade unionists. Together with higher unemployment, this may engender shifts in the balance of power and make it harder to prevent new forms of inequality and dualization from emerging in the wake of the financial crisis.   

While it took a severe crisis to get back on track in the 1990s, the question is whether the current context of crisis and austerity will serve a similar rectifying function or propel new forms social and political division. Except Norway, the Nordic countries were among the hardest hit by the financial crisis, but at least Sweden, Finland and Norway have been recovering quite fast. At any rate, all four countries seem to exit from the slump with robust public households and current account surpluses, and the Nordic countries are long apart from the most crisis-ridden European countries.  Still, faced with the challenges of higher unemployment, low growth in the euro-zone, rising demand for services among the growing elderly population, and inclusion of more heterogeneous populations in work and society, social model adjustment is likely to become a matter of rising political contestation and controversy in the years to come.  
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^1	  This paper, which reviews changes in the social models in the four Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, is based on a chapter prepared for Dølvik and Martin ed., European Social Models Faced with Crisis (forthcoming). The paper is based on research supported by the Norwegian Council of Research, VAM program. 
^2	  Denmark was hit by crisis from the mid-1970s, but continued to expand public services, struggling with increasing budget deficits and current account deficits. It took a decade of low growth to overcome these problems (Goul Andersen, 1997b). Unemployment peaked in 1993, but current accounts had turned into a permanent surplus by 1990, and in spite of cost containment, welfare state institutions were left almost untouched (Goul Andersen, 2000).
^3	  Denmark was an exception as financial regulation was tigthened significantly from 1986-1992. However, in 2004-2007 Denmark repeated the other countries’ failures of the late 1980s (see section 4).
^4	  In Norway, the Centre-Right held office only 2001-2005, then being replaced by a Red-Green government. 
^5	  As compared to Continental Europe, Nordic figures are a little bit inflated by a high proportion of pupils and students having a side job. This rate is particularly high in Denmark.
^6	  Similar to Norway, the rise in oil revenues in Denmark from 1998 onwards contributed significantly to the growth in domestic demand by enabling more expansionary fiscal policies than would otherwise have been possible (Economic Council 2009). Denmark experienced low productivity growth and low growth in GDP as compared  to other European countries, but the growth rate of GNI was twice as high as the growth rate of GDP throughout the first decade after 2000.
^7	  The Rehn-Meidner mechanism was particularly clear in Finland, where homogeneous pay increases left a huge profit margin in the ICT industry that increased its productivity fast, thus encouraging investments and worker flows to this sector. Finland was, after Germany, the country in the euro-zone where unit costs fell strongest from 1998.
^8	  This assertion obviously does not apply to Iceland. Denmark falls in-between. Exports were less seriously hit than in Sweden, Finland and other neighbouring countries, but private consumption dropped significantly due to the burst of the housing bubble and rapidly evaporating household assets, and investments were hit by a credit squeeze of banks having become crucially dependent on short-term borrowing on the international inter bank market (Goul Andersen & Olofsson, 2012).
^9	  For an early compilation table, see OECD interim Report http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/62/42421337.pdf.  Data from national Finance Ministries suggests that about 15 per cent of Norway’s crisis stimulus came in the form of tax cuts, whereas the figure for Denmark was about 50 percent and for Sweden about 70 percent (Berge 2009).
^10	  The tax cut was adopted as ouverture to the 2007 election, but implemented in 2009. The government made a virtue out of necessity and counted the tax cut as part of its crisis stimulus (Goul Andersen, 2011). Some investment programmes were also expanded, but an important stimulus was the termination of a component of the pension system (so-called Special Pension savings). The money (amounting to almost 3 per cent of GDP) was paid out in 2009. In spite of tax relief and cash payment of pension savings, , private consumption plummeted by 4.5 per cent in 2009.  
^11	  In 2009 interest rates were cut to 0,25 in Sweden, 1,00 in Finland, 1,05 in Denmark, and 1,25 in Norway, which in first half of 2010 were raised to 0,50 in Sweden and 1,75 in Norway. 
^12	  During the decade 2000–2009, Denmark’s relative unit labour costs increased by 21 per cent, whereas those of Finland and Sweden decreased by 11,8 per cent and 17,0 per cent, respectively (OECD Economic Outlook, May 2011, Annex Table 43).
^13	  Youth unemployment (15-24) increased in Denmark from 7.9 in 2007 to 13.8 per cent in 2010, from 15.7 to 20.3 in Finland, from 7.3 to 9.3 in Norway, and from 18.8 to 25.2 in Sweden (OECD LFS, 2012).   
^14	  Youth unemployment (15-24) increased in Denmark from 7.9 in 2007 to 13.8 per cent in 2010, from 15.7 to 20.3 in Finland, from 7.3 to 9.3 in Norway, and from 18.8 to 25.2 in Sweden.   
^15	  www.oecd.org, read Feb.27,2012.
